1. Bagi sesuatu perbicaraan kes, khususnya kes jenayah di Mahkamah, keterangan saksi-saksi polis akan diperlakukan sama seperti saksi-saksi yang lain, di mana Mahkamah akan menelitinya dengan cermat bagi memutuskan sama ada ia boleh dipercayai atau disandarkan.
2. Ujian yang ketat terhadap ketepatan (accuracy) dan kredibiliti (credibility) semua saksi, termasuklah saksi- saksi polis, akan dibuat oleh Pihak Mahkamah.
3. Tiada 'kasta' di kalangan saksi.
4. Merujuk kes KESAVAN KRISHNAN lwn. PP & SATU LAGI RAYUAN, [2015] 6 CLJ 163, Mahkamah Rayuan, Putrajaya, Aziah Ali Hmr; Tengku Maimun Mat Hmr; Mohd Zawawi Salleh Hmr, memetik sepertimana berikut:-
“..[39] Dalam alasan penghakimannya, hakim bicara menerima keterangan saksi-saksi polis (SP3 dan SP4) kerana mereka dikatakan tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan, apatah lagi untuk mereka-reka cerita. Tambahan pula, mereka tidak pernah berjumpa dan tidak mengenali satu sama lain. Justeru, tidak timbul perayu pertama dan perayu kedua dianiaya.
[40] Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi polis hendaklah diterima jika keterangan tersebut didapati munasabah (lihat PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] 1 LNS 129; [1962] MLJ 257; PP lwn. Aedy Osman [2009] 1 LNS 13; PP v. Abdul Latif Sakimin [2009] 1 LNS 130; [2005] 6 MLJ 351). Pada pandangan kami, proposisi undang-undang bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi polis hendaklah secara prima facie diterima oleh mahkamah tidak boleh dipakai secara universal tanpa pengecualian. Ia banyak bergantung kepada fakta dan keadaan yang wujud dalam sesuatu kes.
[41] Dalam kes State and Raymond Titus (High Court Ref No: 13858), Mahkamah Tinggi Afrika Selatan membincangkan mengenai pendekatan yang perlu diambil dalam menilai keterangan saksi polis seperti berikut:
[11] As noted earlier, the fact that Horn was a policeman did not per se entitle his evidence to greater weight than that of the accused nor constitute a basis for laying caution to rest. It is true that the accused in the present case, if he was guilty, had a motive to testify dishonestly, ie to avoid conviction and punishment; but this is true in virtually every criminal case. Furthermore, and while one naturally does not expect a policeman to lie and falsely implicate an accused person, it is unfortunately not possible to say that this never happens. Police officials may have a desire to obtain convictions, particularly where a suspect is known to them as a person who has had previous brushes with the law or is one whom they suspect for other reasons (not founded in the evidence before the court) of having engaged in criminal activity. I do not for a moment suggest that the majority of policeman would behave in this way but, where an accused protests his innocence, one cannot dismiss it out of hand as being by its very nature a far-fetched possibility.
[42] Kami bersetuju dengan pendekatan yang diambil oleh kes di atas dan berpendapat ia merupakan pendekatan yang betul dalam mempertimbangkan keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi-saksi agensi-agensi penguatkuasa, termasuklah saksi polis.
[43] Pada pandangan kami, keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi-saksi polis wajar diterima oleh mahkamah sekiranya ia boleh dipercayai dan diyakini walaupun tidak disokong oleh keterangan bebas yang lain. Walau bagaimanapun, ini tidak bermakna keterangan saksi-saksi polis hendaklah diterima dalam apa jua keadaan pun. Dalam kes Tahir v. State (Delhi)[1996] 3 SCC 338, Mahkamah Agung India memutuskan:
6.... In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case.
[44] Mengenai kes Mohamad Ali (supra ), kami ingin membuat beberapa ulasan. Kes ini diputuskan sebelum kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734; [2003] 2 AMR 89 dan Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 yang memutuskan bahawa kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan hendaklah tertakluk kepada penilaian maksimum. Terdapat juga kes-kes di mana saksi-saksi polis telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah mereka-reka, menokok tambah atau membunga-bungai (embellished) keterangan bagi menyokong kes pendakwaan (lihat PP v. Wong Moy [1988] 2 CLJ 521; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 352; [1988] 3 MLJ 280; Chan King Yu v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 601; PP v. Yap Boon Chang [1992] 2 CLJ 1257; [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep) 454; PP v. Foong Sek Hoong [1989] 2 CLJ 1259; [1989] 2 CLJ (Rep) 314).
[45] Dalam kes Chia Meng Leng v. PP [2013] 2 CLJ 926, Hishamudin Yunus HMR berkata:
In the case of the appellant that is now before us, during the trial at the High Court, the defence had tendered as evidence (marked as exh. D36) the notes of the proceeding of the High Court in the other case. The purpose of the defence tendering exh. D36 was to show that PW2 was not credible as his evidence in that other case had been successfully impeached, and that the learned trial judge in the other case (Mohd Zawawi Salleh JC) had found ASP Leong (PW2) (who was called as a key prosecution witness (as PW4)) to be not a credible witness. This finding on ASP Leong's credibility in the other case was one of the main reasons that led to the court in that case to rule that the prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case.
As we have said earlier, exh. D36 was brought to the attention of the learned trial judge in the instant case. The notes of proceedings of that other case (ie, exh. D36) show that PW2 had been impeached in the course of the trial of that other case; and that the charge in that other case arose out of the same set of facts as in our case. In fact, ideally, as a matter of procedure, the two cases should have been tried together, and not tried separately by two different judges (see s. 165(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code). In our judgment, in view of the successful impeachment of the testimony of ASP Leong (PW2) in the other case, and the finding of the learned trail judge there that PW2 was not a credible witness, these findings have seriously undermined PW2's credibility in the instant case; particularly, as the two cases are very closely related by reason of the facts that we have shown above; and that, strictly, these two cases, as we have just said, ought to have been tried together, and not separately. In the present case, we observe that it is obvious from the grounds of judgment that the learned trial judge had failed to give due weight to the PW2's impeachment in the other trial. In fact, the learned trial judge never weighed exh. D36 at all. On this ground alone we find the conviction unsafe and ought to be set aside.
[46] Kesimpulannya, keterangan saksi-saksi polis hendaklah diperlakukan sama seperti saksi-saksi yang lain di mana mahkamah hendaklah menelitinya dengan cermat bagi memutuskan sama ada ia boleh dipercayai atau disandarkan. Ujian yang ketat terhadap ketepatan (accuracy) dan kredibiliti (credibility) semua saksi, termasuklah saksi-saksi polis, hendaklah dibuat oleh mahkamah.”
Semoga Bermanfaat,
Ahmad Deniel Roslan
MFZ & CO
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